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Earnings management has long been an important issue in both academic research and 
regulatory debates. In this study, I provide empirical evidence that institutional 
investors understand and trade on accruals information. Specifically, in a sample with 
ex post evidence of accruals management, I find a significantly negative association 
between discretionary accruals and quarterly changes in institutional ownership, and 
this negative association exists even after the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) 
became effective in October 2000. I also show that institutional trading on accruals 
mitigates the accruals anomaly. This study contributes to understanding market 
efficiency and has implications for accounting standard-setting. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Earnings management has long been an important issue in both academic research and 
regulatory debates. A large number of papers analyze managers’ incentives and 
document abundant evidence that managers employ various methods to manage 
earnings numbers 1 . As a relatively low-cost approach, accruals management is 
believed to be widely used by managers to boost earnings in order to meet or beat 
targets (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, Phillips et al. 2003). An important question 
arises: can investors understand and unravel accruals management? A better 
understanding of this question has strong implications for accounting standard-setting 
and the debate on the Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
 
So far, the empirical literature on this question provides mixed results. Some 
researchers attempt to investigate if stock prices react to accruals management in a 
timely manner. Balsam et al. (2002) and Defond and Park (2001) find some evidence 
that firms  reporting high (low) accruals experience low (high) stock returns in the 
short windows around earnings announcement and 10-Q filing dates. However, Sloan 
(1996) and Xie (2001) show that high accruals firms continue to experience low 
abnormal returns in 1- to 3-year period after the earnings announcement, suggesting 
that the market is inefficient in responding to accruals information. The study on stock 
returns is inconclusive due to the lack of a consensus approach to adjust for risk in the 
calculation of abnormal stock returns. To circumvent this problem, some researchers 
examine how market participants, particularly some sophisticated investors and 
information intermediaries, respond to accruals information.  
                                                 
1 Kothari (2001), Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) provide a survey of the 
literature on earnings management and accruals manipulation. 
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 One stream of such research shows that even sophisticated information intermediaries 
and traders2 seem unable to fully understand the information contained in accruals. 
Bradshaw et al. (2001) and Teoh and Wong (2002) show that, when forming their 
earnings forecasts, financial analysts fail to incorporate predictable future earnings 
declines associated with high accruals. Bradshaw et al. (2001) also find that auditors 
do not signal future earnings problems associated with high accruals by modifying 
their audit opinions or resigning from the engagement. Furthermore, Richardson (2003) 
shows that, on average, short sellers do not trade on the predictable earnings declines 
associated with high accruals. These results corroborate the claim that investors do not 
understand accruals management and fail to anticipate future earnings declines 
associated with high accruals, implying that the market is inefficient in processing 
accruals information. 
 
However, another stream of research suggests that one group of sophisticated 
investors, namely institutional investors, are able to understand the accruals 
management. Balsam et al. (2002) find a negative association between discretionary 
accruals and stock returns in a short window around the 10-Q filing when accruals 
information is released.  Particularly, for firms with high institutional ownership, this 
negative association exists in the window before the 10-Q filing dates. They interpret 
the evidence as suggesting that the market in general and, institutional investors in 
particular, are able to infer and react to accruals management in a timely manner. 
Collins et al. (2003) report that the annual change in the ownership of a subset of 
institutions (“transient” institutions) is negatively related to the level of total accruals 
                                                 
2 The papers cited here, as well as my study, document average behavior of different group of market 
participants. All the studies are silent on the heterogeneity and time variation of their behavior. So it is 
quite possible that some sub-groups of market participants may behave differently from the average at 
some times. The cross-sectional and inter-temporal study is left for research in the future. 
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in the previous year. Lev and Nissim (2006) extend their study and find that the 
quarterly change of transient institutional ownership around annual earnings 
announcement dates is negatively associated with annual total accruals. However, 
they also find that the negative association exists even two quarters after the annual 
earnings announcement, suggesting that institutions seem to respond to stale 
information as well.  
 
In this study, I extend the current evidence on institutional response to accruals by 
directly examining how institutional investors respond to accruals management3. I use 
discretionary accruals as a measure of accruals management. Following Balsam et al. 
(2002), I choose a sample of firms for which there is ex post evidence of earnings 
management. Specifically, I select firms whose quarterly earnings just meet or beat 
analyst consensus forecasts by only one cent. In a recent survey, Graham et al. (2006) 
find that firms and managers are strongly averse to missing analyst forecasts. Ayers et 
al. (2006) show that for firms whose earnings just meet or beat narrowly analyst 
earnings forecasts, discretionary accruals are more likely to be associated with 
accruals management to meet or beat earnings targets. Therefore, the choice of the 
sample and the focus on discretionary accruals provide a cleaner setting to test 
institutional trading on accruals management.  
 
I hypothesize that if institutional investors understand the accruals management in 
these firms and anticipate the reversal in future earnings, they should buy the stocks 
with low discretionary accruals and sell the stocks with high discretionary accruals. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, I document a significantly negative association 
                                                 
3 In this study, I treat institutions as a homogeneous group of investors. In a robustness test, I follow 
Bushee (1998) and classify institutions into transient, quasi-indexer and dedicated subgroups. 
Consistent with previous studies, my results show that transient institutions are the group driving the 
results in this study, while the other two groups appear not to trade on accruals. 
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between quarterly change in institutional ownership and discretionary accruals from 
1988 to 2004.4 After controlling for size, market-to-book ratio, past stock returns, 
level of institutional ownership and other factors, I find that, in my sample, if a median 
size firm reports discretionary accruals of 4.7% of total assets (one standard deviation 
from sample median), institutional investors will decrease their holdings by about 
0.23% of the firm’s total outstanding shares in the quarter of earnings announcement, 
corresponding to institutional selling of 0.80 million dollar shares. Sensitivity tests 
show that the negative association between discretionary accruals and institutional 
trading is robust to alternative measures of discretionary accruals, and remains strong 
after controlling for endogeneity problem. Furthermore, I find that the institutional 
trading is not associated with lagged discretionary accruals announced one or two 
quarters ago. This evidence suggests that institutions respond in a timely manner to 
accruals information. 
 
I further explore the question why institutional investors are able to understand 
accruals management. I conjecture that institutional investors enjoy information 
advantages from two possible sources: the superior information from managers, and/or 
the superior ability to process information. To differentiate these two sources of 
information advantages, I use the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) as 
an experiment. Effective from October 2000, Reg FD was intended to prohibit 
managers from disclosing private information to some selected groups of investors, 
including institutional investors. Ke et al. (2005) find the Reg FD has been effective in 
reducing institutions’ access to private information from managers. Therefore, I expect 
                                                 
4 It is arguable that just meeting or narrowly beating analyst forecasts itself provides a signal to the 
market about accruals management, and therefore institutional trading on accruals is only limited in my 
sample. However, in unreported results, I find that the negative association between institutional trading 
and discretionary accruals remains statistically significant, though weaker, in a sample with the full 
range of earnings surprises. Concerns about the lack of power in the test prevent me from extending the 
study beyond my current sample. 
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that Reg FD would effectively diminish the institutional investors’ private information 
advantage. If institutional investors unravel accruals management based on private 
information5, Reg FD would have a significant impact on their trading on accruals.  
 
After partitioning the sample into pre- and post-Reg FD periods, I find that the 
significantly negative association between change in institutional ownership and 
discretionary accruals exists in both periods. I interpret this evidence as institutional 
investors relying primarily on public information to unravel accruals management. 
The evidence provides strong support to the traditional claim that institutional 
investors are sophisticated users of financial information. 
 
This study proceeds to investigate if institutional trading mitigates the accruals 
anomaly. Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) show that stocks with high accruals yield low 
returns in the future, and vice versa. I find that the negative association between 
discretionary accruals and one-year ahead abnormal returns becomes weaker for firms 
where institutional investors trade most heavily on accruals information. The evidence 
supports the argument that institutional trading mitigates accruals anomaly and thus 
improves market efficiency. 
 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it provides evidence that 
institutional investors have the ability to understand accruals management and take 
this into consideration in their trading decisions. Regulators have long been worried 
about the possibility that managers use accounting discretion to systematically mislead 
investors and resources are misallocated as a result. My results suggest that at least 
                                                 
5 “Private information” here is defined broadly. It includes all the information disclosed by managers 
and exclusively available to institutional investors. The private information may not necessarily be 
material by itself, but it is possible that combining it with other information may help institutions judge 
the likelihood of accruals management. 
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some sophisticated investors in the market are not misled by accruals management. 
Given the assumption that stock prices are set by these sophisticated investors, my 
results are also consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis in that the market 
quickly incorporates accruals information into stock prices.  
 
Second, my study extends and refines previous studies on institutional trading on 
accruals information. My choice of the sample and research design enables me to 
perform cleaner tests and draw stronger inferences. Lastly, my study shows that Reg 
FD has little impact on institutional trading on discretionary accruals, thus provides 
evidence that it is more likely that institutional investors’ superior ability to process 
public information help them unravel accruals information. This adds to the growing 
literature on how Reg FD affects institutional investors’ information environment. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
In this chapter, I briefly review the related literature and develop testable hypotheses. 
Section 2.1 reviews studies on earnings management to meet analyst forecasts and 
market response to earnings manipulation. Section 2.2 goes through research on 
institutional investors. In Section 2.3, I formulate the hypotheses. 
 
2.1 Accruals Management and Market Response 
There is a vast accounting literature on earnings management. Fields, Lys and Vincent 
(2001), Healy and Wahlen (1999), and Kothari (2001) provide extensive surveys of 
the literature on earnings management and accruals manipulation. These surveys 
present detailed discussion on the theoretical and empirical aspects of earnings 
management. In this section, I focus on recent studies on accruals management to meet 
analyst forecasts6 and how the market and investors respond to accruals management.  
 
As an important information intermediary, financial analysts play an increasingly 
prominent role in the financial markets. Their earnings forecasts have been widely 
used as a proxy for market expectation (see, e.g., O’Brien 1988). Though managers 
have other earnings benchmarks to meet or beat (see, e.g., Degeorge et al. 1999), 
analyst forecasts have become the most important target in recent years (Dechow and 
Skinner 2000, Brown and Caylor 2005). The importance of analyst forecast is also 
acknowledged by financial executives. In a recent survey done by Graham et al. 
(2006), CFOs rank analyst forecasts as the number one earnings target. The market in 
                                                 
6 Literature has provided ample evidence on accruals management on other occasions. For example, 
Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b) and Rangan (1998) find evidences that firms increase discretionary accruals 
to boost earnings numbers prior to initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings. Discretionary 
accruals are also found to be abnormally high before firm managers exercise their options (Bartov and 
Mohanram (2004)) or sell their shares (Park and Park (2004)). See the surveys for more comprehensive 
coverage. 
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general rewards firms whose earnings meet or beat analyst forecasts and penalize 
those whose earnings miss the target (Bartov et al. 2002, Kasznik and McNichols 
2002).  
 
The importance of analyst forecasts, together with well-documented market reaction to 
earnings surprise, intensifies managers’ incentive to manipulate earnings to meet or 
beat analyst forecasts (Dechow and Skinner 2002). McVay (2006) finds that managers 
opportunistically shift expenses from core expenses to special items, in order to 
overstate “core” earnings. This shifting, a way to manage core earnings, is more 
pervasive when it allows the manager to meet analyst forecasts. Ayers et al. (2006) 
find that measures of earnings management (e.g., total accruals, discretionary accruals, 
and deterred tax expenses) are significantly larger for firms whose earnings just meet 
analyst forecasts. This evidence is consistent with managers using accruals to manage 
earnings upward to meet analyst forecasts. 
 
Regulators and accounting theorists have long been concerned with the possibility that 
the market and investors are systematically misled by earnings management, and as a 
result, economic resources are mis-allocated. Therefore, it is important to investigate if 
the market and investors can see through earnings management. The literature so far 
provides limited results as to this question. DeFond and Park (2001) show that stocks 
returns within a short window around earnings announcement is negatively associated 
with discretionary accruals. However, it is arguable that accruals information may not 
be available until a few weeks after the earnings announcement date, because firms 
disclose detailed financial statements only when they file for 10-K or 10-Q with the 
Security and Exchange Commission. Another problem with DeFond and Park’s study 
is that their results are sensitive to the measure of discretionary accruals. Balsam et al. 
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(2002) study the market reaction to accruals management in the short windows around 
10-Q filing dates when accruals information is widely available. Using a sample of 
613 firm-quarter observations in which the firm’s quarterly earnings meet or beat the 
consensus analyst forecasts by only one cent, they show that there is a negative 
association between size-adjusted returns and seasonal change in discretionary 
accruals in the 17-day window around the 10-Q filing dates.  
  
Although studies on market returns in short-window appear to weakly support the 
claim that the market can see through accruals management, some researchers suggest 
that the market reaction is incomplete. Sloan (1996) finds that firms with very high 
(low) total accruals earn low (high) returns in the future. Xie (2001) shows that firms 
experience size-adjusted abnormal returns of -6.1% in the first year and -3.3% in the 
second year after they report extremely high discretionary accruals, and a hedge 
strategy based on accruals information yields significant abnormal returns. Rangan 
(1998) and Teoh et al. (1998b) suggest that accruals management before seasonal 
equity offerings may contribute to the long-run underperformance of the offering firms. 
The finding of abnormal returns in the longer window associated with accruals 
management implies that the market does not completely see through the accruals 
management, and thus under-react. However, this stream of study is complicated by 
the lack of a consensus approach to adjust for risks when calculating long-run 
abnormal returns. In other words, the abnormal returns in the longer window may be 
due to missing risk factors. It is still an on-going debate as to whether the abnormal 
returns associated with accruals are due to mis-pricing or risk (see, e.g., Hirshleifer et 
al. 2006).  
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To circumvent the issue of measuring long-run abnormal returns, some researchers 
turn their attention to sophisticated users of financial information, and examines if 
they can see through accruals management. The existing results are mixed. One stream 
of research provides evidence that even sophisticated users of accounting information 
cannot see through accruals management. Bradshaw et al. (2001) and Teoh and Wong 
(2002) show that, even though it is predictable that future earnings will decline if 
current accruals are high, financial analysts fail to incorporate this information into 
their earnings forecasts. Bradshaw et al. (2001) also show that another group of 
sophisticated users of financial information, auditors, also fail to signal this 
information in their audit opinions, or through the change of auditors. Richardson 
(2003) finds that short sellers on average do not exploit the information in accruals 
and predictable declines in future earnings associated with high accruals. Although the 
evidence supports the view that these groups of market participants are unable to 
understand accruals management, it also possible that these users face conflicts of 
interests (for analysts and auditors) or risks (for short sellers) when responding to 
accruals information, so they choose to ignore the information, after weighting the 
costs and benefits of alternative actions. 
 
Another stream of research focuses on institutional investors and finds some evidence 
supportive to EMH. Balsam et al. (2002) study the market reaction to accruals 
management in the short windows around 10-Q filling dates when accruals 
information is widely available. Using a sample of 613 firm-quarter observations in 
which the firm’s quarterly earnings meet or beat the consensus analyst forecasts by 
only one cent, they show that there is a negative association between size-adjusted 
returns and seasonal change in discretionary accruals in the 17-day window around the 
10-Q filing dates. They also find that for firms with high institutional ownership, this 
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negative relationship exists prior to the release of 10-Q information. They argue that 
investors in firms with high institutional ownership are relatively more sophisticated 
and able to infer accruals management from other sources, so that they respond to 
accruals management earlier than other investors. Their argument is consistent with 
EMH that market as a whole, and sophisticated investors in particular, are able to 
understand accruals management and respond in a timely manner. Collins et al. (2003) 
find that annual change in the ownership level for a subset of institutional investors 
(“transient institutions”) is negatively correlated with annual total accruals. Lev and 
Nissim (2006) further document the negative association between total annual accruals 
and quarterly changes in both transient and non-transient institutional ownership in the 
quarter of annual earnings announcement. However, they also find that the annual 
total accruals are negatively associated with institutional trading two quarters after the 
earnings announcement, suggesting that institutions seem to respond to stale 
information7.   
 
In summary, existing literature shows that managers have incentives and manipulate 
accruals to meet or beat earnings forecasts made by financial analysts. The existing 
literature provides mixed results on whether the market and sophisticated users of 
financial information can see through a accruals management and undo its effects. 
 
2.2 Institutional Investors 
Institutional investors are significant players in the markets. As a group, institutions 
own more than half of the publicly traded equities in recent years (Gompers and 
Metrick 2001). Institutional investors are commonly believed to be sophisticated 
                                                 
7 Lev and Nissim (2006) use annual total accruals in their regression, and do not control for the 
quarterly accruals in the quarter of institutional trading. Autocorrelation in accruals may explain their 
results that institutional investors respond to accruals announced two quarters earlier. 
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investors. Relative to individual investors, institutions have over-whelming 
information advantage. They have better access to information (both public and 
private), and better resources and ability to process information. Some recent studies 
examine the trading behavior of institutional investors and find supportive evidence 
that institutional investors are able to trade on public and private information. Ke and 
Petroni (2004) show that transient institutional investor can predict a break in a string 
of positive earnings and trade accordingly at least one quarter before the break. Hribar 
et al. (2005) find that transient institutional investors are able to forecast earnings 
restatements and significantly reduce their holdings in a restating firm at least one 
quarter prior to the quarter of the restatement.  
 
Institutional trading is often thought as the arbitrageur force that eliminates mispricing 
in the market and keeps stock prices efficient. Bartov et al. (2002) show that, Post-
Earnings-Announce-Drift (PEAD), a market anomaly showing that stock returns 
continue to drift after earnings announcement in the direction of earnings surprise, is 
much weaker for firms with higher level of institutional ownership. Ke and 
Ramalingegowda (2005) find evidence consistent with institutional investors 
arbitraging PEAD and making stocks prices more efficient in incorporating earnings 
surprises. However, institutions’ arbitrage activity is subject to various limits of 
arbitrage, such as risks and transaction costs, which may explain why market 
anomalies can survive over time. Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) show that 
institutions trade less aggressively in firms with high transaction costs. Lev and 
Nissim (2006) and Mashruwala et al. (2006) find that firms with extreme accruals tend 
to be small firms, with high idiosyncratic risks and high transaction costs, which may 
prevent institutions from arbitraging away the accrual anomaly. 
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 2.3 Hypotheses Development 
In this study, I examine the trading behavior of institutional investors in response to 
accruals management. I argue that if institutional investors are able to decipher 
accruals management, they are more likely to respond and trade. On one hand, the 
fierce competition in the asset management industry and career concerns force 
institutional investors to exploit every piece of information which may affect the 
returns of assets under their management. Since accruals management has strong 
implications on future earnings and stock returns, institutional investors can not 
overlook the information in accruals. Further, institutional investors are free from the 
conflicts of interests which may prevent analysts and auditors from incorporating 
accruals information into earnings forecasts and audit opinions. Therefore, if 
institutional investors are sophisticated enough to understand accruals management, I 
expect that they will buy stocks with low discretionary accruals and sell stocks with 
high discretionary accruals. My first hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is: 
 
H1: There is a negative association between changes in institutional ownership 
and discretionary accruals. 
 
I further investigate the sources of institutional investors’ information advantages. 
Relative to small investors, institutional investors are usually assumed to be 
sophisticated users of information, and able to process and interpret both public and 
private information. Institutional investors also have privileged access to conference 
calls and private conversation with managers. They can acquire private information 
from managers ahead of other investors. Some studies have documented evidence that 
institutional investors actually can trade on private information (e.g., Ke and Petroni 
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2004, Hribar et al. 2005). A priori, it is unknown whether institutional investors’ 
ability to understand accruals management comes from their private information from 
managers or from their superior ability to process information, or both. Following Ke 
et al. (2005), I use the adoption of Reg FD to differentiate the sources of information 
advantages for institutional investors. Adopted in August and effective in October 
2000, Reg FD prohibits firms from disclosing information to selected group of 
investors. Aimed at “leveling the playing ground for all investors”, Reg FD intends to 
diminish the information disparity between investors arising from firms disclosing 
information to some selected investors through conference calls or private 
conversation, which are usually inaccessible to retail investors.   
 
Some studies show that Reg FD has a significant impact on the information 
environment of the firms8, as well as on the trading behavior of some groups of 
institutional investors. Ke et al. (2005) find that after Reg FD, transient institutions are 
unable to predict the break in the string of consecutively positive earnings, suggesting 
that Reg FD effectively reduces managers’ selectively disclosing private information 
to institutions. Therefore, if institutional investors’ ability to unravel accruals 
management comes solely or partially from the private information, the negative 
association between their trading and discretionary accruals would disappear or 
become weaker in the post-Reg FD period. On the other hand, if their ability results 
from their superior ability to process public information, there will be little difference 
in institutional trading on accruals between the pre- and post-Reg FD periods. Based 
on this analysis, I test the second hypothesis stated in alternative form as follows: 
 
                                                 
8 See Francis et al. (2004) for an excellent summary on this literature. 
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H2: The association between the change in institutional ownership and 
discretionary accruals becomes weaker or disappears in the post-Reg FD 
periods. 
 
If institutional investors can unravel and trade on accruals, I would expect their trading 
should mitigate accrual anomaly and make stock prices more efficient. Therefore, 
stocks where institutions trade most aggressively on accruals should have future stock 
returns less associated with discretionary accruals. The third hypothesis thus is given 
as follows (in alternative form): 
 
H3: The association between future stock returns and discretionary accruals is weaker 
for firms where institutions aggressively trade on discretionary accruals. 
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
 
This chapter describes the research design and construction of key variables used in 
the main tests. Section 3.1 develops an empirical model of institutional trading on 
accruals. The model is extended to a two-stage least square regression model 
controlling for endogeneity problem. Section 3.3 describes how I measure 
discretionary accruals, and section 3.4 gives the approach to calculate characteristic 
adjusted abnormal returns.  
 
3.1 A model of institutional trading on accruals  
My primary research question is whether institutional investors respond to accruals 
management in such a way that they invest more (less) in firms with high (low) 
Discretionary Accruals (DA), and if Reg FD has any impact on institutional investors’ 
trading behavior on DA. To test my hypothesis, I estimate the following model of 
quarterly change in institutional ownership in firm i and for quarter t: 
 
ΔIOit+1 = α0 + α1DAit + α2DAit*REGFD + α3IOit +   α4LNMVit + α5BMit  + α6PWit + 
α7RETit + α8ROAit + α9TURNit + α10LEVit + α11STDRETit + α12BETAit + 
α13REVit+1  + εit                                                                                           (1) 
 
In model 1, ΔIO is the quarterly change in institutional ownership; DA is the 
discretionary accruals in earnings for quarter t. Hypothesis 1 predicts a negative 
association between the change in institutional ownership and discretionary accruals, 
or a negative α1. To test for H2, I add into the model an interactive term of DA and a 
dummy variable REGFD which indicates the adoption of Reg FD. REGFD takes value 
of 1 for observations in the period after year 2000, and zero otherwise. H2 predicts 
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that, if the negative association between the change in institutional ownership and 
discretionary accruals becomes weaker or disappears in the post-Reg FD period, α2 
will become positive, and α1 + α2 may be statistically insignificant.  
 
I also include 11 control variables to account for the institutional preference for certain 
firm characteristics and other information available in the quarter. The first set of 
control variables is related to past finding that institutions tend to invest in ‘safe’ firms 
to comply with prudent-man standards. Accordingly I include two variables to control 
for prudence of institutions: return on assets (ROA) and financial leverage (LEV). 
ROA is measured as the operating income divided by total assets, and serves as a 
proxy for profitability and safety of investments (profitable firms are less likely to fail). 
LEV is measured as the ratio of the book value of debt to the sum of book value of 
debt and market value of equity, and serves as a proxy for financial risk. The second 
set of control variables accounts for institutional preference for high liquidity and low 
transaction costs. I use firm size (LNMV) and share turnover (DTURN) as proxies for 
liquidity and transaction costs. I define LNMV as the natural log of firm’s market 
capitalization (expressed in millions of dollars), and DTURN as the average daily 
share turnover (share volume divided by total share outstanding) over the 6 month 
period prior to the beginning of quarter t. The third set of controls comes from 
institutional trading behavior documented in previous studies. Institutional investors 
tend to hold stocks with high volatility and high beta (Sias 1996), and follow 
momentum strategies (Daniel et al. 1995). Accordingly, I control for STDRET, BETA 
and RET in the model, where STDRET is the standard deviation of daily stock returns, 
BETA is the slope of market model estimated using daily stock and value-weighted 
CRSP index returns, and RET is the buy-and-hold stock returns. These three variables 
are calculated using data over the 6 month period prior to the beginning of quarter t. I 
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further include the ratio of book value to market value of equity (BM) because many 
institutions follow either “value” or “growth” strategies (e.g., Gompers and Metrick 
2001). I also include in model 1 the revision of analysts earnings forecasts (REV) to 
control for other information available in the market. REV is measured as the change 
in consensus (median) IBES analyst forecasts of annual earnings over the quarter t + 1, 
and scaled by stock price. Following Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005), I control for 
PW, which is the weighted average of portfolio weight (in percent) of a stock in the 
portfolio of an institutional investor, weighted by the total market capitalization of the 
institution’s stock portfolio at the end of quarter t. PW measures the fraction of total 
stock investments of all institutional investors that are allocated to a given firm. If total 
holdings by institutional investors are more heavily weighted towards a given firm, 
institutional investors, as a whole, are likely to sell shares in that firm in the following 
quarter for portfolio diversification. I therefore expect the coefficient on PW to be 
negative. Finally, to mitigate potential bias due to the omission of correlated variables, 
I control for institutional ownership (IO) at the end of quarter t. IO may itself affect 
the subsequent change in institutional ownership. Given the finding in Bushee and 
Noe (2000) that institutional ownership is mean reverting, I predict a negative 
coefficient for IO. 
 
To illustrate the timing of the events used in the measurement of the variables, I draw 
the following time line: 
 
                   |                              Change in institutional ownership in quarter t+1                            | 
--------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------- 
 Beginning of Quarter t+1           Announcement of Earnings       10-Q/10-K         End of quarter t+1 
                                                              for quarter t                           Filing 
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I calculate ΔIO and REV over the quarter t + 1. IO, LNMV, PW and LOGP are 
measured at the beginning of quarter t + 1. DA, BM, LEV, ROA, and LEV are 
calculated using information from the financial statements for quarter t. RET, 
STDRET and BETA are computed using daily returns in the 6-month period prior to 
the beginning of quarter t + 1. 
 
3.2 Two-stage least square regression 
I hypothesize that institutional investors adjust their holdings based on accruals 
information if they can decode accruals management. However, previous literature 
demonstrates that firm’s decision on discretionary accruals could be affected by 
institutional ownership. Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1997) argue the institutional 
owners can monitor the firm closely and deter managers from accruals management. 
They find evidence that high IO is associated with low DA. To address the 
endogeneity problem of ΔIO and DA, I use two-stage least square regressions to 
estimate the following equations: 
 
DAit = β0 + β1CFOit + β2DAi,t-1 + β3IOit + β4LNMVit + β5BMit + β6LOSSit + 
β7RDEBTit + β8FINit + β9MERGERit + β10BIG4it  + υit                                   (2) 
ΔIOit+1 = α0 + α1DA_ESTit + α2RESIDUAL+ α3IOit + α4LNMVit + α5BMit + α6PWit + 
α7RETit + α8ROAit + α9TURNit + α10LEVit + α11STDRETit + α12BETAit + 
α13REVit    + εit                                                                                                                                               (3) 
 
Equation 2 is basically the model used in Ashbaugh et al. (2003) to estimate 
discretionary accruals. In Equation 2, CFO is cash flow from operations, taken directly 
from the statements of cash flows. DAt-1 is lagged discretionary accruals. LOSS is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm’s operating income is negative in quarter t, 
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and zero otherwise. RDEBT is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. FIN and 
MERGER are dummy variables, taking value of 1 if the firm has financing or merger 
activities in the year respectively, and zero otherwise. BIG4 is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the firm’s auditor is the one of the four (five) major auditing firms, and 
zero otherwise. IO, LNMV and MB are as defined in the previous section. These 
variables are widely used in accounting literature to explain DA.  
 
In stage 1, I estimate Equation 2 and obtain predicted value of DA (DA_EST) and 
residuals (RESIDUAL). I modify Equation 1 and get Equation 3 by replacing DA with 
DA_EST and adding RESIDUAL into equation. In stage 2, I estimate Equation 3. 
Inclusion of residuals in Equation 3 will yield unbiased estimate for DA. And if 
endogeneity problem exists, I should observe a statistically significant coefficient for 
RESIDUAL. 
 
3.3 Estimation of discretionary accruals 
I estimate discretionary accruals using the cross-sectional modified Jones model as in 
Hribar and Collins (2002). Specifically, total accruals are regressed on the change in 
sales and level of property, plant, and equipment for each fiscal quarter using all firm-
quarters with the same 2-digit SIC code and December fiscal year-end. More formally, 
the model is as follows: 
 
TACCt/At-1 = α0 + α1(1/At-1)+ α2(ΔREVt/At-1) + α3(PPEt/At-1) + εt                         (4) 
 
where TACCt is total accruals provided in the cash flow statement in quarter t, 
measured as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat 
data #76) and discontinued operations (data #78) and net cash flow from continuing 
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operations (#108). ΔREVt is revenue (data #2) in quarter t less revenue in quarter t – 1, 
PPEt is gross property plant and equipment (data #118) at the end of quarter t, At-1 is 
the total assets (data #44) at the end of quarter t – 1. Following Kothari et al. (2005), I 
include a constant in the model to control for heteroskedasticity and an omitted size 
variable. 
 
Using the estimated coefficients from the above regression, I calculate the non-
discretionary and discretionary accruals for firm i in quarter t as follow:  
 
NDAit = α0 + α1(1/Ait-1)+ α2((ΔREVit – ΔARit)/Ait-1) + α3(PPEit/Ait-1)               (5) 
DAit = TACCit - NDAit                                                                                                   (6) 
 
where ΔREVit – ΔARit represents the change in revenue less the change in accounts 
receivables (data #103).  
 
Kothari et al. (2005) argue that the discretionary accruals calculated from cross-
sectional Jones models should be adjusted for firm performance, in order to enhance 
the reliability of inferences from earnings management research. Because I do not 
have a control sample of firms which are free of earnings management, I do not use 
firm-by-firm matching based on return on assets (ROA), as in their paper. Instead, I 
adopt a portfolio matching method as in Ashbaugh et al. (2003). Specifically, I sort 
firms with the same two-digit SIC code into quintiles based on their prior quarter’s 
ROA. The performance adjusted DA for the sample firm is the difference between the 
firm’s raw DA and the median DA for each ROA portfolio. This approach controls for 
the impact of performance on discretionary accruals within industry, without having to 
identify control firms which are free of earnings management. I report the main results 
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using this portfolio-ROA-matched DA. In subsequent sensitivity tests, I redo all the 
analysis using three alternative measures of DA. The first alternative is the DA as 
calculated directly from Equation 6. To get the other two measures of DA, I add ROA 
and lagged ROA separately into Equation 4 as additional explanatory variables, and 
calculate DA as in Equation 6.   
 
3.4 Characteristic Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
In this study, I compute institutional abnormal returns using the characteristic-adjusted 
returns as in Daniel et al. (1997), hereafter DGTW. DGTW argue that it is important 
to control for firms’ characteristics in computing abnormal returns for institutions, 
because institutions may simply follow trading strategies based on certain firms’ 
characteristics, such as momentum, P/E ratio, and size. DGTW therefore propose to 
adjust stock returns by benchmark portfolio returns, while benchmark portfolios are 
constructed based on firm size, book-to-market ratio, and return momentum. To 
construct the DGTW benchmark portfolio returns, we start with all stocks having book 
equity values in Compustat, and with data on stock returns and market capitalization 
of equity in CRSP. At the end of June each year, we first assign each stock to a size 
quintile (using NYSE size quintile breakpoints). Within each size quintile, we rank the 
stocks based on their industry adjusted book-to-market ratios, and assign them to 
book-to-market quintiles, yielding a total of 25 size and book-to-market sorted 
fractiles. Stocks in each fractiles are further sorted into quintiles, based on their prior 
12-month returns. This results in a total of 125 benchmark portfolios. We compute 
benchmark portfolio returns as monthly value-weighted buy-and-hold return for each 
of the 125 portfolios. The benchmark portfolios are re-constructed at the end of each 
June. The benchmark for each stock is the portfolio to which it belongs. The monthly 
abnormal return for each stock is the difference between the stock’s monthly raw 
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return and its monthly benchmark portfolio return. We then compute the buy-and-hold 
benchmark adjusted returns for each stock in the 12-month window starting from the 
end of quarter t. 
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Chapter 4: Data and Sample 
 
In this Chapter, I report the sample selection procedure and data sources in Section 4.1, 
and sample descriptive statistics in Section 4.2. 
 
4.1 Sample Selection 
To increase the power of empirical tests, I choose a sample of firms with ex post 
evidence of accruals management. Specifically, I follow Balsam et al. (2002) and 
require the firm’s quarterly earnings per share to either exactly meet or exceed by one 
cent the most recent consensus analyst forecast provided by IBES for that quarter. 
This requirement follows from previous literature which suggests that managers’ 
incentive to manipulate accruals intensifies when the manipulation can allow the 
earnings to meet analyst forecasts. Although meeting or just beating forecasts by only 
one cent, by itself, is not sufficient to conclude that the firm has engaged in earnings 
management, it is less likely that it occurs purely by chance. Ayers et al. (2006) show 
that, for firms whose earnings just meet or marginally beat analyst forecasts, the 
association between discretionary accruals and meeting or beating analyst forecasts is 
more likely due to accruals manipulation. Therefore, focus on this sample enables me 
to increase the power of my test and draw stronger inference as to the institutional 
trading on accruals management. 
 
The sample selection procedure is outlined in Panel A, Table 1. I require firms to have 
a fiscal year end at December, to have data on analysts’ consensus forecasts on 
quarterly earnings and actual earnings number in I/B/E/S Unadjusted summary file9, 
                                                 
9 Payne and Thomas (2003) show that I/B/E/S adjusted files have problems on calculating true earnings 
surprise, due to the  adjustment for stock splits. I use both adjusted and unadjusted I/B/E/S summary 
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to have accounting data in Compustat, returns data in CRSP monthly file, and 
institutional ownership data on the CDA Spectrum database10. Since I calculate DA 
using data directly from cash flow statements, which is only widely available from 
1988 onwards, my sample period starts in 1988 and ends in 2004. I require a 
December fiscal year-end so that seasonal differences across the calendar year are 
eliminated when I use the cross-sectional modified Jones model to estimate 
discretionary accruals. To ensure that inferences from the analysis are valid and that 
my results are not driven by extreme values, I exclude firms with negative book-to-
market ratio and truncate key variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The final 
sample consists of 9,466 firm-quarter observations from 2,445 distinct firms. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Panel B reports the distribution of sample observations by year. The number of 
observations increases over time until the late 1990s. This evidence is consistent with 
increasing importance of analyst forecast with more and more firms trying to meet the 
forecasts. The upward trend ceases in 2000s, probably due to the mounting scrutiny by 
investors in firms’ earnings and “the number’s game” between managers and analysts 
in recent years. The average institutional ownership, however, exhibits an almost 
monotonic increasing trend over time.  Panel C shows that the observations are 
approximately evenly distributed among the 4 quarters, without any concentration in a 
specific quarter.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
files to do the analysis and find similar results. I report all the results in this paper using unadjusted 
I/B/E/S summary file. 
10 CDA Spectrum compiles the institutional ownership data from the SEC’s Form 13(f), which must be 
filed each calendar quarter by all institutional with greater than $100 million in equity securities. On the 
form, common stock position greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 must be disclosed. 
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4.2 Sample Description 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample. The mean of DA is positive, 
and the median DA is very close to zero. The distribution of DA is comparable to 
those in other studies (e.g., Balsam et al. 2002). The mean (median) of ∆IO is 0.4% 
(0.3%), small but positive. It shows that, on average, institutions increase their 
holdings in the sample firms when the firms report earnings above or at par with 
consensus analyst forecasts. This may be due to the overall increase in IO over time 
(see, e.g, Gompers and Metrics 2001), and/or the average positive response of 
institutions to the firms that are able to meet or beat targets. However, there are 
substantial variations in ∆IO, as evident from the standard deviation of 5.3%. Notebly, 
about 43% of sample observations actually experience a decrease in institutional 
ownership.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The sample firms are relatively large, with a mean (median) market capitalization of 
3,134 (345) million dollars, because firms in the sample must be followed by analysts 
and held by institutions. On average, the firms are profitable (with a mean ROA of 
0.7%), relatively ‘safe’ (with a mean leverage ratio of 0.260), of average market risk 
(with a beta of 0.954), and lose 0.7% in share prices in the past 6 months. Analysts in 
general lower their forecast of annual earnings after the quarterly earnings 
announcement (with mean revision of -0.4% of share prices), which is consistent with 
the findings that analysts adjust downward their initial over-optimistic forecasts over 
time (Richardson et al. 2004). However, the median and third quartile of the forecast 
revision are zero, which shows that many analysts do not revise their forecasts, since 
the recently announced earnings numbers are at par with their previous forecasts. 
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Table 3 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between the 
variables. As expected, DA and ∆IO are negatively correlated, with a Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation coefficient of -0.044 (-0.048), which is significant at 
traditional significance level. This lends some support for the first hypothesis. The 
correlation coefficients between ∆IO and control variables also have the expected 
signs. Notably, the correlation between DA and REV is negative and statistically 
significant, showing that analysts revise downwards the earnings forecasts for firms 
that report high discretionary accruals. This suggests that analysts do consider accruals 
management when they form their earnings forecasts. However, a detailed analysis is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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Chapter 5: Empirical Results 
 
This chapter reports the empirical results from tests on the three hypotheses. Section 
5.1 documents the regression results from tests on hypothesis 1 and 2. Section 5.2 
studies the impact of institutional trading on accrual anomaly. Results from various 
sensitivity tests are reported in Section 5.3. 
 
5.1 Institutional trading and discretionary accruals 
Table 4 reports results from multivariate regressions of Equation 1. I first estimate 
Equation 1 with the pooled sample of observations. Estimated coefficients and t-
statistics are reported in column 2 and 3, respectively. To mitigate the problem of 
heteroskedasticity and possible clustering observations from the same firm, I use 
Roger’s (1994) standard errors to calculate t-statistics. Roger’s standard errors are 
capable of adjusting standard errors for heteroskedasticity and any type of correlation 
present in the observations from the same firm, while assuming independence between 
firms. The results from the pooled regression show that, after controlling for other 
factors, DA is significantly negatively associated with ∆IO, with an estimated 
coefficient of -0.048 and t-statistic of -3.47. This gives strong support to the first 
hypothesis. The coefficient of -0.048 has an economic interpretation. Based on the 
sample, if a median size firm in the sample reports DA of 4.7% of total assets (one 
standard deviation from mean DA), institutional investors will reduce their holdings 
by 0.23% (= 0.048×0.047) of the firms total outstanding shares, or sell the firm’s 
shares worth 0.80 million (=0.23%×345.9) dollars. Therefore, the coefficient of -0.048 
is both statistically and economically significant.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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My second hypothesis, that the association between ∆IO and DA will become weaker 
in the post Reg FD period, is not supported by the data. The coefficient for the 
interaction term, which represents the difference in coefficients of DA between the 
two sub-sample periods, is very close to zero and statistically insignificant (t-stat = 
0.21). The F-test shows that sum of the coefficients for DA and DA*REGFD (-0.048 
+ 0.005 = -0.043) is statistically significant (p-value = 0.039). Therefore, the results 
shows that institutional investors consistently invest less in firms reporting high DA in 
both prior-to and post Reg FD periods. The findings that Reg FD does not diminish 
institutional trading on DA suggest that the institutions unravel accruals management 
based on their superior ability to process public information. 
 
I also use Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach to run cross-sectional regressions for 
each quarter11 with results reported in the last two columns of Table 4. The coefficient 
estimates and t-statistics for the sample are the mean and t-statistics of the time series 
of the quarterly estimates respectively. Consistent with results from the pooled 
regression, the coefficients of DA are negative and statistically significant. The 
magnitude of the coefficients is comparable across pooled and quarterly regressions. 
Therefore, the quarterly regression results reinforce the results from pooled 
regressions, supporting the first hypothesis.  
 
For the control variables, the coefficients in general have consistent signs with the 
simple Pearson and Spearman correlations as shown in Table 3. Specifically, ∆IO is 
negatively associated with current IO level, and mean portfolio weight, but positively 
                                                 
11 Quarterly regressions also controls for the factors which may affect institutional trading in general in 
a specific quarter. For example, aggregate funds flow in and out of institutions each quarter in the 
market, which may be correlated with DA. 
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associated with firm size, leverage ratio, beta, past stock returns and analyst forecast 
revisions.  
 
To take into account the possible endogeneity problem between ∆IO and DA, I use the 
two-stage least square regressions to refine the analysis. Specifically, I estimate 
Equation 2 and obtain predicted DA and residuals from the regression, then run 
Regression 3 with residuals as an additional explanatory variable. The results for the 
regressions in the two stages are reported in Table 4. In stage 1, 18.45% of the 
variation in DA can be explained by the right-hand side variables in equation 2. This 
R2 is comparable with that reported in Ashbaugh et al. (2003). From the results in 
stage 2, it is interesting to note that the coefficient for the residuals obtained from 
stage 1 regression is significant. This suggests that endogeneity problem does exist 
between ∆IO and DA and the two-stage least square approach is appropriate and 
superior to the ordinary least square regression. The coefficient for estimated DA, 
however, remains negative and statistically significant, suggesting that negative 
association between ∆IO and DA is robust to endogeneity problem.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Lev and Nissim (2006) find that the quarterly change in transient institutional 
ownership is negatively associated with annual total accruals in the first quarter after 
the end of the previous fiscal year. However, their findings show that this negative 
association also exists in the last quarter of the previous fiscal year, and in each of the 
two quarters after the earnings announcement. Given that institutional investors tend 
to respond the public information quickly, it is unclear why institutional trading is 
related to total accruals which were announced more than 6 months ago. To show that 
institutions really trade on DA only, it is important to exclude the possibility that 
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institutional trading is related to stale information. In table 6, I report results from the 
regressions of ∆IO in adjacent quarters on DA announced in quarter t, as well as DA 
announced in adjacent quarters. Since DA is serially correlated, it is necessary to 
control for DA in the quarter of institutional trading. The results show that after 
controlling for DA announced in the adjacent quarters, institutional trading in quarter t, 
t+2 and t+3 is not correlated with DA announced in quartet t + 1. The evidence shows 
that institutional investors do not respond to accruals information after they trade on it 
in quarter t + 1, suggesting that institutions do not trade on stale information.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
To summarize, I find that multivariate regressions show there is a significantly 
negative association between ∆IO and DA. This is consistent with my first hypothesis 
and suggests that institutional investors exploit accruals information to adjust their 
holdings in a company. The analyses also show that the negative association between 
∆IO and DA continue to persist even after the adoption of Reg FD. These results 
remain robust after I control for endogeneity problem between ∆IO and DA. 
 
5.2 The impact of institutional trading on accruals anomaly 
I hypothesize and find evidence that institutional investors trade in response to 
accruals information. In this section, I investigate if institutional trading on accruals 
improves the efficiency of stock prices. Since Sloan (1996), a number of studies find 
stocks with low accruals outperform those with high accruals, a phenomenon labeled 
as “accruals anomaly”. A simple arbitrage strategy, investing long in low-accruals 
stocks and short in high-accruals stocks, is shown to generate significant abnormal 
returns. Given the finding in the above section that institutions trade on accruals, I 
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expect that their trading will mitigate and eliminate the accruals anomaly in my 
sample.  
 
Following previous studies, I sort the observations into quintiles based on DA and ∆IO 
respectively for each quarter. Then I define two dummy variables, BUY and SELL, to 
indicate the observations in which institution trade on accruals information most 
intensively. BUY (SELL) takes value of 1 for firms with ∆IO is in the top (bottom) 
quintile of ∆IO rankings and DA is in the bottom (top) decile of DA rankings. The 
definitions of BUY and SELL are similar to those defined in Ke and Ramalingegowda 
(2005). To test if institutional trading has an impact on accruals anomaly, I run the 
following regression model for the pooled sample: 
  
 ARi,12 = α0 + α1RKDAi,t + α2BUY,it  + α3SELL,it   + εit                                    (7) 
 
where AR12 is the characteristic-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns over 12 
months after the end of quarter t, and RKDA the quintile rankings of DA, rescaled to 
the range of [0, 1].  Based on prior studies on accruals anomaly, I expect α1 to be 
negative since DA has been shown to be negatively associated with future stock 
returns. If institutional trading improves stock price efficiency, α2 and α3 will be 
positive, while α1 + α2 and α1 + α3 will be statistically insignificant, suggesting that 
institutional trading mitigates the negative association between DA and future 
abnormal returns.  
 
Table 7 reports the results for the regression. First of all, RKDA is significant and 
negatively associated with future stock returns, consistent with findings in Xie (2001). 
Since I scale RKDA such that it ranges from 0 to 1, the coefficient of RKDA implies 
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that the difference in abnormal returns between lowest and highest DA quintiles is 
4.1% in the 12-month period after the end of quarter t + 1. Both dummy variables have 
positive coefficients, as expected, though only the coefficient for BUY is significant at 
10% level. F-test shows that neither of the sum of coefficients, α1 + α2 and α1 + α3, is 
statistically significant. The results suggest that firms which institutions trade most 
heavily have abnormal returns less associated with DA, which is consistent with the 
argument that institutional trading mitigates accruals anomaly and makes stock prices 
more efficient in terms of quickly incorporating the information content of DA into 
stock prices.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
5.3 Robustness tests 
In this section, I conduct several robustness tests on the association between 
institutional trading and discretionary accruals. In summary, my main results are 
robust to alternative measures of discretionary accruals, are not driven by observations 
in fourth quarter alone, and remain strong in sub-samples classified by firm size and 
market-to-book ratio. Classifying institutional investors into three types yields similar 
results as documented in previous studies. 
 
In the first set of robustness tests, I use three alternative measures of discretionary 
accruals and re-performed the main analysis. The first measure is the discretionary 
accruals from cross-sectional Jones model without adjustment for performance. For 
the other two measures, I add ROA and lagged ROA into the Equation 4 when 
estimating cross-sectional coefficients, and compute the discretionary accruals as in 
Equation 6. Adding ROA or lagged ROA adjusts discretionary accruals for firm 
performance, with the assumption of a linear relationship between accruals and 
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performance. Table 8 reports the results using these three alternative measures of 
discretionary accruals. For each measure of discretionary accruals, the coefficient of 
DA is consistently negative and statistically significant. Therefore, the main result, a 
negative association between institutional trading and discretionary accruals, is robust 
to these alternative measures. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Lev and Nissim (2006) find that institutions shun away from firms with extreme 
accruals because these firms exhibit undesirable characteristics, such as small firm 
size and high risk. So it is necessary to investigate the impact of firm size and book-to-
market ratio on the association between institutional trading and discretionary accruals.  
I construct two dummy variables, LARGE and VALUE, to indicate large firms and 
value stocks respectively. LARGE takes a value of 1 if the firm size is above its 
median in quarter t, and 0 otherwise. VALUE equals 1 if the book-to-market ratio is 
above its median in quarter t, and 0 otherwise. I include the interaction of DA with 
these two dummy variables in the regression and report results in Table 9. The 
coefficients for both interaction terms are negative, but statistically insignificant. The 
coefficient for DA, however, remains significantly negative. F-test shows that the sum 
of coefficients for DA and the interaction terms are significant. In unreported results, I 
run regression for large and small firms separately, as well as for high and low book-
to-market ratio firms separately, and get similar results. Overall, the results suggest 
that the negative association between ∆IO and DA exists in both large and small firms, 
as well as in both value and glamour stocks.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
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Some people argue that the discretionary accruals in the fourth quarter are different 
from those in other quarters. Managers face greater pressure to meet or beat analyst 
forecasts for both quarterly and annual earnings, so it is possible that institutions are 
only able to identify accruals management in the fourth quarter. To check if my results 
are driven by the observations from the fourth quarter only, I rerun the regression 
model 1 for observations from the fourth quarters and from the first three quarters 
separately. The results, reported in Table 10, show the negative association between 
institutional trading and discretionary accruals exists in both groups of observations, 
and the coefficients of DA have comparable magnitude. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
Finally, I try to address the issue that different types of institutional investors may 
respond to DA in different ways. Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investors into 
three types based on their portfolio turnover, diversification and momentum trading: 
institutions that hold concentrated portfolio for the long haul (dedicated institutions), 
institutions that are similar to indexers and hold large diversified portfolios for the 
long run (quasi-indexer institutions), and institutions that trade frequently in a large 
diversified portfolio (transient institutions). Collins et al. (2003) and Lev and Nissim 
(2006) find the transient institutions are the group responding to accruals information. 
I try to replicate Bushee’s classification scheme and get similar, though not identical 
results. Table 11 reports the regression results for the three types of institutions. 
Consistent with previous studies, the results show that discretionary accruals are 
negatively associated with quarterly change in transient institutions’ ownership. The 
trading of the other two types of institutions is not associated with discretionary 
accruals.  
[Insert Table 11 here]
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
In this study, I examine the institutional trading in response to accruals management. I 
hypothesize that institutional investors are sophisticated investors with the ability to 
unravel accruals management, and predict a negative association between the change 
in institutional ownership and discretionary accruals (a measure of accruals 
management). Using a sample of firms with ex post evidence of accruals management, 
I document evidence consistent with this prediction. Specifically, after controlling for 
other factors affecting institutional trading, I find a significantly negative association 
between discretionary accruals and quarterly change in institutional ownership. This 
negative association remains robust to alternative measurements of discretionary 
accruals. I further analyze the sources of institutional investors’ informational 
advantage, using the adoption of Reg FD. Effective in October 2000, Reg FD prohibits 
managers from releasing private information to some selected investors. I find the 
negative association between discretionary accruals and institutional trading exists in 
both pre- and post Reg FD periods. The evidence shows that institutional investors’ 
ability to undo accruals management may be due to their superior ability to process 
public information, supporting the claim that institutions are sophisticated users of 
financial information. Lastly, I find that institutional trading in response to accruals 
management mitigates accruals anomaly and thus improves market efficiency. 
 
This study has a number of implications for the research on institutional investors and 
accruals management. First, it provides evidence that institutional investors have the 
ability to understand accruals management and take this into consideration in their 
trading decisions. Regulators have long been worried about the possibility that 
managers use accounting discretion to systematically mislead investors and therefore 
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resources are misallocated. My results suggest that at least some sophisticated 
investors in the market are not misled by accruals management. Given the assumption 
that stock prices are set by these sophisticated investors, my results are also consistent 
with the Efficient Market Hypothesis in that the market quickly incorporates accruals 
information into stock prices. Second, my study extends and refines previous studies 
on institutional trading on accruals information. My choice of the sample and research 
design enables me to perform cleaner tests and draw stronger inferences. Lastly, my 
study shows that Reg FD has little impact on institutional trading on discretionary 
accruals, thus provides evidence that it is more likely that institutional investors’ 
superior ability to process public information help them unravel accruals information. 
This adds to the growing literature on how Reg FD affects institutional investors’ 
information environment. 
 
This study also paves the way to future research. First, it remains an interesting 
question that why managers still engage in accruals management given that 
sophisticated investors appear to be able to unravel the manipulation.   Second, it is 
important to investigate how institutional investors respond to other earnings 
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 TABLE 1: 
Sample selection 
 






Observations that either meet or beat IBES forecast by 1 cent per share, with 
fiscal year ends of December 1988 through 2004 
23,222 5,490 
Observations with Institutional Ownership (IO) data available for two 
consecutive quarters 
22,365 5,195 
Observations for which Discretionary Accruals (DA) under the cross-
sectional Jones model could be computed  
11,218 2,807 
Observations with past 6 months return data available 11,206 2,804 
Observations with positive Market-book ratio and other control variables 10,415 2,632 
Observations after trimming DA, IO, IO Change at 1 and 99 percentile 9,466 2,445 
 










1988 34 0.004 28 0.370 
1989 150 0.016 121 0.406 
1990 182 0.019 147 0.422 
1991 256 0.027 189 0.416 
1992 342 0.036 247 0.449 
1993 403 0.043 298 0.438 
1994 523 0.055 362 0.425 
1995 506 0.053 382 0.434 
1996 703 0.074 496 0.428 
1997 870 0.092 609 0.419 
1998 974 0.103 664 0.429 
1999 824 0.087 586 0.437 
2000 670 0.071 505 0.478 
2001 810 0.086 568 0.525 
2002 806 0.085 556 0.561 
2003 698 0.074 480 0.590 
2004 715 0.076 515 0.604 
 










1 2,252 0.238 1,381 0.467 
2 2,483 0.262 1,435 0.481 
3 2,464 0.260 1,421 0.485 





Descriptive Sample Statistic  
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
∆IO 0.004 0.053 -0.020 0.003 0.029 
DA 0.003 0.047 -0.018 0.000 0.025 
IO 0.477 0.241 0.277 0.484 0.674 
MCAP 3134.470 19244.110 124.450 345.878 1157.550 
LnMV 6.051 1.702 4.824 5.846 7.054 
BM 0.482 0.382 0.245 0.392 0.609 
PW 0.046 0.163 0.004 0.010 0.029 
RET -0.007 0.345 -0.225 -0.041 0.154 
ROA 0.007 0.042 0.004 0.013 0.024 
DTURN 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.008 
LEV 0.260 0.201 0.093 0.208 0.392 
STDRET 0.035 0.017 0.023 0.032 0.044 
BETA 0.954 0.722 0.470 0.847 1.310 
REV -0.004 0.011 -0.005 0.000 0.000 
 
The sample consists of 9,466 firm-quarter observations from 1988 to 2004. Variables are defined as 
follows: 
DA = discretionary accruals deflated by total assets for quarter t, where discretionary 
accruals are calculated as residuals from cross-sectional Jones model and adjusted for 
DA for the firm with median ROA in the portfolio. 
IO = percentage of institutional ownership at the end of quarter t. 
∆IO = change in institutional ownership between two quarter ends, calculated as IOt+1 – IOt. 
MCAP = market capitalization at quarter t end (in million dollars). 
LnMV = Natural log of market value of common equity at quarter t end (in million dollars). 
BM = ratio of book value to market value of common equity at the end of quarter t. 
RET = Buy-and-hold return in the two quarters before the end of quarter t. 
PW = mean portfolio weight (in percent) of a stock in the portfolio of an institution, 
weighted by the total market cap of the institution’s stock portfolio at the end of quarter 
t. 
ROA = Return on Assets, calculated as operating income divided by total assets for quarter t. 
DTURN = Average daily shares turnover (daily share volume divided by total share outstanding) 
in the 6 months prior to the end of quarter t. 
LEV =ratio of book value of debt to the market value of total capital (book value of debt plus 
market value of equity). 
BETA = the market model slope, estimated using daily stock and value-weighted index returns 
during the 6 months prior to the end of quarter t. 
STDRET = standard deviation of daily stock returns in the 6 months prior to the end of quarter t. 
REV = Revisions in consensus (median) IBES analyst forecasts of annual earnings, scaled by 




Pearson and Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
 ∆IO DA IO LNMV BM PW RET ROA DTURN LEV STDRET BETA REV 
∆IO 1.000 -0.048 -0.055 0.024 -0.042 -0.005 0.098 0.003 0.002 -0.019 0.001 0.020 0.133 
DA -0.044 1.000 0.005 -0.002 -0.059 -0.008 -0.016 0.006 0.054 -0.083 0.026 0.016 -0.038 
IO -0.080 0.006 1.000 0.554 -0.055 0.611 0.122 0.094 0.262 0.107 -0.338 0.142 0.017 
LNMV 0.010 0.003 0.506 1.000 -0.399 0.803 0.172 0.178 0.092 -0.005 -0.458 0.224 0.075 
BM -0.047 -0.054 -0.083 -0.367 1.000 -0.356 -0.269 -0.345 -0.147 0.527 0.097 -0.182 -0.174 
PW -0.011 0.002 0.135 0.527 -0.149 1.000 0.204 0.288 0.069 0.016 -0.551 0.170 0.113 
RET 0.090 -0.009 0.078 0.113 -0.238 0.031 1.000 0.136 -0.031 -0.084 -0.179 -0.023 0.233 
ROA 0.006 0.050 0.137 0.171 -0.116 0.084 0.092 1.000 -0.072 -0.279 -0.311 -0.062 0.211 
DTURN -0.023 0.022 0.169 0.078 -0.118 -0.071 -0.020 -0.107 1.000 -0.286 0.412 0.430 -0.073 
LEV -0.011 -0.073 0.070 -0.029 0.513 0.045 -0.109 -0.025 -0.230 1.000 -0.234 -0.261 -0.083 
STDRET -0.008 -0.006 -0.327 -0.401 0.149 -0.207 -0.094 -0.356 0.377 -0.167 1.000 0.259 -0.140 
BETA 0.006 0.010 0.116 0.172 -0.144 0.046 -0.026 -0.120 0.441 -0.251 0.321 1.000 -0.041 
REV 0.111 -0.002 0.070 0.143 -0.220 0.055 0.186 0.173 -0.062 -0.138 -0.187 -0.042 1.000 
  





Pooled and Quarterly Regressions of Institutional Ownership Changes 
 
 Pooled Regression  Quarterly Regressions 
Variable Coefficients t-statistic  Coefficients t-statistic 
Intercept 0.007 2.11**  0.019 3.08*** 
DA -0.048 -3.47***  -0.044 -2.65*** 
DA*REGFD 0.005 0.21    
IO -0.028 -9.96***  -0.037 -8.17*** 
LNMV 0.002 3.87***  0.001 1.41 
BM -0.002 -1.26  -0.006 -1.83* 
PW -0.014 -3.39***  -0.014 -3.21*** 
RET 0.012 7.08***  0.016 5.48*** 
ROA -0.009 -0.67  0.032 0.85 
DTURN -0.041 -0.43  0.281 1.12 
LEV 0.009 2.62***  0.012 2.60*** 
STDRET -0.031 -0.70  -0.212 -1.76* 
BETA 0.002 2.38**  0.002 1.82* 
REV 0.501 9.38***  0.490 5.20*** 
      
F-test on  DA + DA*REGFD 4.28     
p-value 0.039     
Adjusted (Mean) R2 (%) 3.02   16.87  
N 9,466   9,432  
 
The sample consists of 9,466 firm-quarter observations from 1988 to 2004.  
REGFD is a dummy variable, equals 1 for observations after year 2000, and 0 for other observations.  
Other variables are defined in Table 2. 
In pooled regression, t-statistics are calculated using Roger’s standard errors which controls for 
heteroskedasticity and any type of correlation for observations from the same firm. *, ** and *** 
indicates the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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TABLE 5 
Two-Stage-Least-Square Regression of Institutional Ownership Changes 
 
 Stage 1  Stage 2 
Variables Coefficients t-stat  Coefficients t-stat 
Intercept 0.008 2.93***  0.006 1.35 
DA_EST    -0.095 -3.18*** 
RESIDUAL    -0.034 -2.50** 
CFO -0.408 -42.95***    
DA1 0.104 11.33***    
IO 0.006 2.77***  -0.028 -9.51*** 
LNMV 0.002 5.42***  0.002 3.14*** 
BM -0.003 -2.04**  -0.003 -1.32 
LOSS -0.015 -11.89***    
RDEBT -0.013 -6.03***    
FIN 0.002 1.45    
BIG4 -0.004 -2.00**    
MERGER -0.001 -0.73    
RET    0.012 7.39*** 
PW    -0.014 -3.35*** 
ROA    -0.029 -1.85* 
LOGP    0.001 0.54 
DTURN    -0.044 -0.45 
LEV    0.008 2.37** 
STDRET    -0.008 -0.17 
BETA    0.002 2.39** 
REV    0.474 8.64*** 
      
      
Adjusted R2 18.45   3.04  
N 9,466   9,466  
 
The sample consists of 9,466 firm-quarter observations from 1988 to 2004. 
CFO is Cash Flow from Operation, taken from statements of cash flows. 
DA1 is DA for quarter t-1. 
LOSS is a dummy variable, equals 1 if operating income is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
RDEBT is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets for quarter t. 
FIN is a dummy variable, equals 1 if the firm has financing activities in the year, and 0 otherwise. 
MERGER is a dummy variable, equals 1 if the firm has merger activities in the year, and 0 otherwise. 
BIG4 is a dummy variable, equals 1 if the firm’s auditor is one of big 4 auditors, and 0 other wise. 
RESIDUAL is the residuals from the stage 1 regression. 
Other variables are defined in Table 2. 
T-statistics are calculated using Roger’s standard errors which controls for heteroskedasticity and any 
type of correlation for observations from the same firm. *, ** and *** indicates the coefficients are 






 Regressions of Institutional Trading in Adjacent Quarters 
 
 Quarter t Quarter t + 2 Quarter t + 3 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
INTERCEPT 0.015 3.86*** 0.011 2.79*** 0.012 2.91*** 
DA -0.003 -0.23 0.019 1.53 -0.013 -1.00 
DA0 -0.034 -2.68*** -0.053 -4.26*** -0.022 -1.74* 
IO -0.028 -9.12*** -0.028 -9.13*** -0.023 -7.16*** 
LNMV 0.001 2.53** 0.002 3.10*** 0.001 1.48 
BM -0.006 -2.63*** -0.002 -1.18 -0.006 -3.41*** 
PW -0.016 -3.97*** -0.016 -3.84*** -0.013 -3.26*** 
RET 0.002 1.38 0.011 5.20*** 0.008 4.05*** 
ROA -0.005 -0.25 0.016 1.04 0.069 4.49*** 
DTURN -0.020 -0.19 0.101 0.91 -0.013 -0.12 
LEV 0.011 2.98*** 0.004 1.00 0.008 2.16** 
STDRET 0.017 0.36 -0.065 -1.32 0.044 0.88 
BETA 0.000 0.47 0.003 2.77*** 0.003 2.70*** 
REV 0.501 8.10*** 0.233 7.05*** 0.194 5.86*** 
       
Adjusted  R2 (%) 2.21  3.24  2.03  
N 9,177  8,632  8,562  
       
 
The sample consists of 9,466 firm-quarter observations from 1988 to 2004.  
DA0 is the discretionary accruals in the quarter of institutional trading, estimated from modified cross-
sectional Jones model and adjusted for DA for the firm with median ROA in the portfolio. 
Other variables are defined in Table 2. 
T-statistics are calculated using Roger’s standard errors which controls for heteroskedasticity and any 
type of correlation for observations from the same firm. *, ** and *** indicates the coefficients are 




The impact of institutional trading on the accruals anomalies 
 
 Coefficients t-stat  
Intercept 0.038 2.46** 
RKDA -0.041 -1.71* 
BUY  0.066 1.69* 
SELL  0.013 0.33 
   
F-test on  F-stat p-value 
RKDA + BUY 0.22 0.637 
RKDA + SELL  0.89 0.344 
   
Adjusted (Mean) R2 (%) 0.06  
N 8,577  
 
The sample consists of 8,577 firm-quarter observations from 1988 – 2004. Dependent variable is the 
characteristic-adjusted buy-and-hold returns in the 9 months after the end of quarter t. Explanatory 
variables are defined as follows: 
RKACC  = Quintile ranking of DA, rescaled into the range of [0, 1]. 
RKIO = Quintile ranking of institutional ownership at the end of quarter t, rescaled into the 
range of [0, 1]. 
RKIOCHG = Quintile ranking of change in institutional ownership during quarter t + 1, rescaled 
into the range of [0, 1]. 
BUY = 1 if RKACC is 1 and RKIOCHG is 5, zero otherwise. 
SELL  = 1 if RKACC is 5 and RKIOCHG is 1, zero otherwise. 
T-statistics are calculated using Roger’s standard errors which controls for heteroskedasticity and any 
type of correlation for observations from the same firm. *, ** and *** indicates the coefficients are 






Quarterly Regressions of Institutional Ownership Changes 
On Alternative Measures of DA 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
INTERCEPT 0.017 2.71*** 0.018 2.78** 0.019 2.91*** 
DA -0.030 -1.73* -0.036 -2.26** -0.038 -2.46** 
IO -0.036 -7.77*** -0.038 -8.03*** -0.037 -7.87*** 
LNMV 0.001 1.48 0.001 1.54 0.001 1.10 
BM -0.004 -1.30 -0.005 -1.42 -0.006 -1.73* 
PW -0.013 -2.78*** -0.014 -3.08*** -0.015 -3.23*** 
RET 0.018 5.74*** 0.018 5.52*** 0.017 5.66*** 
ROA 0.073 1.72* 0.046 1.31 0.074 1.94* 
DTURN 0.276 1.22 0.292 1.21 0.298 1.22 
LEV 0.013 2.74*** 0.013 2.81*** 0.014 3.07*** 
STDRET -0.198 -1.64* -0.213 -1.77* -0.217 -1.79* 
BETA 0.002 1.42 0.002 1.51 0.002 1.63 
REV 0.486 5.03*** 0.482 5.09*** 0.464 4.87*** 
       
Adjusted  R2 (%) 17.16  17.48  17.21  
N 9,445  9,436  9,447  
 
 
In model 1, DA is estimated using modified cross-sectional Jones model. In Model 2, DA is estimated 
using modified cross-sectional Jones model with current ROA (Return of Assets) as an additional 
explanatory variable in the estimation regressions. In Model 3, DA is estimated using modified cross-
sectional Jones model with lagged ROA (Return of Assets) as an additional explanatory variable in the 
estimation regressions.  Other variables are defined in Table 2. 
T-statistics are calculated using Roger’s standard errors which controls for heteroskedasticity and any 
type of correlation for observations from the same firm. *, ** and *** indicates the coefficients are 
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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 TABLE 9 
Impact of Firm Size and Book-to-Market Ratio on the Association between Quarterly 
Changes in Institutional Ownership and Discretionary Accruals 
 
 Size  Book-to-Market Ratio 
Variable Coefficients t-statistic  Coefficients t-statistic 
Intercept 0.007 2.08**  0.008 2.13** 
DA -0.037 -2.44***  -0.038 -2.51** 
DA*LARGE -0.021 -0.92    
DA*VALUE    -0.017 -0.71 
IO -0.028 -9.91***  -0.028 -9.93*** 
LNMV 0.002 3.85***  0.002 3.80*** 
BM -0.002 -1.21  -0.002 -1.22 
PW -0.013 -3.35***  -0.013 -3.35*** 
RET 0.012 7.28***  0.012 7.30*** 
ROA -0.012 -0.88  -0.012 -0.90 
DTURN -0.041 -0.43  -0.039 -0.41 
LEV 0.009 2.69***  0.009 2.70*** 
STDRET -0.030 -0.68  -0.032 -0.73 
BETA 0.002 2.27**  0.002 2.32** 
REV 0.501 9.37***  0.500 9.36*** 
      
Adjusted (Mean) R2 (%) 3.05   3.05  
F test on DA + DA*LARGE 10.33     
F test on DA + DA*VALUE    9.65  
p-value 0.001   0.002  
N 9,466   9,466  
 
 
The sample consists of 9,466 firm-quarter observations. Every quarter, the observations are partitioned  
into two groups based on median firm size (book-to-market ratio).LARGE is a dummy variable, equals 
1 for firms whose size is above the median size, and zero otherwise. VALUE is a dummy variable, 
equals 1 for firms whose book-to-market ratio is above the median book-to-Market ratio.  
Other variables are defined in Table 2. 
T-statistics are calculated using Roger’s standard errors which controls for heteroskedasticity and any 
type of correlation for observations from the same firm. *, ** and *** indicates the coefficients are 






Sensitivity Test: Regressions for Different Quarters 
 
 Quarter 1 – 3  Quarter 4 
 Coefficients t-stat  Coefficients t-stat 
INTERCEPT 0.007 1.86*  0.004 0.50 
DA -0.051 -3.55***  -0.040 -2.02** 
IO -0.028 -8.89***  -0.024 -4.20*** 
LNMV 0.002 3.29***  0.002 1.94* 
BM -0.004 -1.94*  0.007 1.48 
PW -0.014 -3.19***  -0.010 -1.02 
RET 0.009 4.95***  0.024 6.34*** 
ROA 0.001 0.08  -0.039 -1.45 
DTURN -0.014 -0.14  -0.084 -0.38 
LEV 0.011 2.93***  0.003 0.47 
STDRET 0.001 0.03  -0.096 -1.07 
BETA 0.001 0.56  0.007 3.52*** 
REV 0.538 8.60***  0.402 3.93*** 
      
Adjusted  R2 (%) 3.04   3.83  
N 7,199   2,267  
 
Variables are defined as in Table 2. 
Beneath the coefficients are t-statistics. T-statistics are calculated using Roger’s standard errors which 





Sensitivity Test: Types of Institutional Investors 
 
 Transient Quasi-Indexer Dedicated 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
Intercept -0.002 -0.82 0.003 1.99** 0.013 3.46*** 
DA -0.016 -2.28** -0.009 -1.70* -0.006 -0.46 
IO -0.131 -23.79*** -0.042 -10.11*** -0.069 -16.95*** 
LNMV 0.001 5.23*** 0.000 2.16** 0.002 3.59*** 
BM 0.001 1.09 0.001 1.45 -0.001 -0.27 
PW -0.008 -3.58*** -0.005 -2.63*** -0.001 -0.32 
RET 0.006 6.40*** 0.000 -0.20 0.007 4.34*** 
ROA 0.002 0.30 0.000 -0.03 -0.009 -0.60 
DTURN 0.274 4.82*** 0.010 0.23 0.165 1.71* 
LEV 0.006 2.78*** -0.002 -1.57 0.008 2.25** 
STDRET 0.019 0.72 -0.057 -2.77*** -0.219 -4.61*** 
BETA -0.002 -3.18*** 0.001 1.70* 0.003 3.29*** 
REV 0.166 5.16*** 0.015 0.59 0.312 5.66*** 
       
Adjusted  R2 (%) 6.72  1.15  3.79  
N 9,442  9,442  9,442  
 
 
Dependent variables are changes in three types of institutional ownership in the quarter of 
announcement of quarterly earnings for the sample firms. Explanatory variables are defined as in Table 
2. 
Beneath the coefficients are t-statistics. T-statistics are calculated using Roger’s standard errors which 
controls for heteroskedasticity and any type of correlation for observations from the same firm. 
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